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INTRODUCTION
Whether nurses should be considered "supervisors" under the National
Labor Relations Act' ("NLRA" or "Act") is an important legal question,
which has divided the circuits. A growing number of people will need
2nursing home and hospital care in the upcoming years. However, health
care is experiencing many changes, including increased competition.3
Since labor costs comprise sixty percent of overall hospital costs, many
4employers are looking for ways to downsize. Therefore, employees are
losing job security and are turning to unions to provide it. Despite National
Labor Relations Board ("Board" or "NLRB") decisions which hold that
nurses are not supervisors and thus are covered under the NLRA, some
circuits have overruled the Board.5 Part I of this note discusses the
background of the NLRA and its coverage of supervisors. Part II explains
the Supreme Court decision in 1994, which invalidated the old patient care
test. Part III discusses the current circuit split over the new "independent
judgment" test. Part IV analyzes the detrimental effect on unions if the
nurses are declared supervisors. Part V analyzes this effect on physicians.
Part VI calls for the courts to follow congressional intent and employ a
presumption that nurses are not supervisors. It also analyzes the decision in
t J.D. Candidate 2001, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.S. 1998, Cornell
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1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994).
2. See NLRB v. Hilliard Dev. Corp., 187 F.3d 133, 137 (1st Cir. 1999).
3. G. Roger King, Where Have All the Supervisors Gone?-The Board's Misdiagnosis
of Health Care & Retirement Corp., 13 LAB. LAw. 343, 343 (1997).
4. Id. at 344.
5. See, e.g., Mid-America Care Found. v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 1998);
Glenmark Assocs., Inc. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 1998); Passavant Ret. Health Ctr.
v. NLRB, 149 F.3d 243 (3rd Cir. 1998).
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NLRB v. Hilliard6 and concludes that it was correctly decided. Finally, it
calls for Congress to amend the NLRA and declare nurses non-supervisory.
I. BACKGROUND: SUPERVISORS, PROFESSIONALS, AND THE NLRA
A. NLRA and Supervisors
The NLRA7 affords employees the basic right to organize collectively
and engage in collective bargaining free from employer retaliation.8 The
Act imposes a duty on employers to bargain in good faith with the
elected/designated representative union.9 It was intended to aid unions in
their struggle to bargain with management. 10
The NLRA also established the NLRB, an administrative agency
charged with the responsibility of enforcing the Act and ensuring
employees' rights." The power to determine appropriate bargaining units
was vested in the NLRB.2
As it was originally passed in 1935, the Act covered all employees.'3
Supervisors were given the right to organize in bargaining units and
negotiate with the employer.' 4 However, employers were concerned that
supervisors' loyalties would be divided between management and the
union.'
5
The Supreme Court was hesitant to exclude supervisors from
6. 187 F.3d 133 (1st Cir. 1999).
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994). The NLRA was enacted to increase the bargaining
power of employees in negotiations with employers. The opening paragraph states that
"[t]he inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom
of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the
corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow
of commerce .. " Id. § 151. It is this interstate commerce rationale that gave Congress the
power to pass the NLRA. See id.
8. Id. §§ 157, 158(a)(1).
9. Id. § 158(a)(5).
10. Id.
11. Id. §§ 151, 153. The Board adjudicates cases in which union or employers are
accused of unfair labor practices, such as failing to bargain in good faith. Id. § 158. The
court of appeals gives great deference to the Board's findings. The court upholds the
Board's findings if they are supported by "substantial evidence." Id. § 160(e).
12. Id. § 159(b). When a union files a petition for election, the Board must examine the
job classifications and duties of employees because the bargaining unit must conform to the
NLRA. It is at this point that supervisors are removed from the unit. Id. (noting that the
Board cannot approve a bargaining unit that includes "professional employees").
13. David M. Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded Managers from Covered Professionals
Under the NLRA, 89 CoLUM. L. REv. 1775, 1785 (1989).
14. Id.
15. Id.
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coverage. Accordingly, in 1947 the Court in Packard Motor Car v.
NLRB,16 held that supervisors were covered by the Act until there was a
congressional mandate to the contrary.17 In this case, the NLRB found that
foremen on an assembly line were employees in spite of their supervisory
authority.1 8  At that time, the Act defined an employer as "any person
acting as an agent of an employer." 9 In Packard, the Court held that
Congress did not intend to classify supervisors as employers just because
they acted in the interest of their employers. 20
The congressional mandate the Court was waiting for became a reality
soon after the Packard decision. In 1947, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley
Amendments to the NLRA, which excluded supervisors from the definition
of an employee.21 The rationale underlying the amendments was that
supervisors' loyalties would be split between the employer, for whom he
was an agent, and the employees with whom he was fighting with against
management.22 This logic contradicts the purpose of the NLRA which is to
equalize bargaining power.23 Although supervisors are excluded from
24coverage under the NLRA, they can still be in a union. However, anemployer is under no duty to bargain with them.2 The Act expressly
16. 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
17. Id. at 489.
18. Id. at488.
19. Id. At this time an employee was defined as:
any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular
employer, unless [the Act] explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any
individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with,
any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has
not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment....
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994).
20. Packard, 330 U.S. at 488. The Court held that a literal reading of the statute would
render all employees of a master's business "employers," because they all act in his best
interests. Id. The dissent argued that if supervisors were covered by the Act, the
consequence would alter industrial philosophy up until this point and eliminate the line
between management and labor. Id. at 494 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1994).
22. S. REP. No. 80-105, at 3 (1947). Another policy rationale for excluding supervisors
is that employers can replace striking supervisors if need be. NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705
F.2d 1461, 1465 (7th Cir. 1983). There needs to be "a reasonable balance of power between
employers and unions and avoidance of ... conflicts of interest." Ann M. Benedetto, NLRB
v. Health Care and Retirement Corp. of America: Analysis and Disapproval of the National
Labor Relations Board's Determination of Supervisory Status of Nurses, 12 J. CONTEMp.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 701,709 n.59 (1996).
23. Benedetto, supra note 22, at709 n.59.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1994).
25. Id. § 158(a)(1). It is an unfair labor practice to bargain in bad faith with employees.
Id. It is also an unfair labor practice to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of their right to self-organize, their right to form, join or assist labor organizations,
their right to bargain collectively, or their right to engage in concerted activities for the
20011
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defines who is considered a supervisor and the NLRB is charged with the
responsibility of interpreting the Act.26 The Act defines a "supervisor" as:
any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer,
to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge,
assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to
direct them, or adjust their grievances, or effectively to
recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing
exercise of such authority is not merely routine or clerical in
nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
27
Congress intended this definition to exclude those employees that had
minor supervisory duties and only include those with genuine management
prerogatives. 28  The committee distinguished between straw bosses,
leadmen, set-up men, and other minor supervisory employees and
supervisors that have genuine management power to hire, fire, and
promote.29 The definition of "supervisor" was not meant to include all of
those who voluntarily gave up the rank and file and began working on
management side.3
Therefore, to be considered a supervisor under the NLRA, the Board
asks three questions: (1) whether an employee exercises authority in the
interest of an employer; (2) whether an employee uses independent
judgment; and (3) whether an employee performs any of the twelve
enumerated functions.3 ' The Board is given great deference in determining
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. Id. § 158(a).
26. Id. § 152(11). There is a policy in favor of construing the definition of supervisor
narrowly because an employee who is a supervisor loses protection under the NLRA.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB, 655 F.2d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 1981).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1994). An employee need only possess the authority to
perform one of these functions, regardless of whether he actually exercises it or the
frequency with which he utilizes it. James Nederlander, 276 N.L.R.B. 32, 34 (1985); 23
NLRB ANN. REP. 40 (1958).
28. S. REP. No. 80-105, at4 (1947).
29. Edwin A. Keller, Jr., Death by Textualismn: The NLRB's "Incidental to Patient
Care" Supervisory Status Test for Charge Nurses, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 575, 583 (1996).
30. R. Jason Straight, Who's the Boss?: Charge Nurses and "Independent Judgment"
After National Labor Relation Board v. Health Care & Retirement Corporation of America,
83 MInN. L. REv. 1927, 1933 (1999).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1994). The Board can also look to secondary factors to make
its determination, including the ratio of supervisors to workers and identification of the
highest authority present. Northwoods Manor, Inc., 260 N.L.R.B. 854, 855 (1982). The first
prong is usually presumed to be satisfied unless the supervisor directs workers employed by
a different employer. Daniel D. Barker, NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp.: Erosion
of NLRA Protection for Nurses and Other Professionals?, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 345, 351
(1996). Step two of the analysis dictates that those who routinely direct others based on
higher skill level are not supervisors under the Act. Int'l Ctr. For Integrative Studies/The
Door, 297 N.L.R.B. 601, 602 (1990). The twelve enumerated functions include the ability
to hire, fire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, discipline,
responsibly direct, or adjust grievances of other employees. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1994).
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whether an employee is a supervisor because of its special competence in
applying the Act to everyday life.32
B. NLRA and Professional Employees and the Tension with Supervisors
In 1947, Congress amended the NLRA to exclude supervisors and
include professionals in the definition of employee.33 This amendment
gave the NLRB's prior ruling that professionals were covered by the Act
the power of law.34 Professionals have separate bargaining units due to
their unique interests.35 When Congress explicitly extended coverage of
the NLRA to supervisors, it stated that the types of professionals to be
covered under this new definition were "engineers, chemists, scientists,
architects, and nurses. 36 Clearly, nurses are considered professionals and
thus should be covered by the NLRA. However, once professional status is
determined there is another hurdle to overcome before the individual is
covered by the Act. The Supreme Court ruled in NLRB v. Yeshiva
University37 that professionals may also be considered supervisors if they
fit the definition and, therefore, would not be protected by the NLRA.3
32. Northeast Util. Serv. Corp. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 621, 623 (1st Cir. 1994).
33. Taft-Hartley Amendments, Ch. 120, Title I, § 101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1982)).
34. In re Gen. Cable Corp., 57 N.L.R.B. 1651, 1653 (1944). For a definition of
"professional employee," see 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1994), which defines a "professional
employee" as:
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in
character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical works;
(ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its
performance; (iii) of such a character that the output produced or the result
accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time; (iv)
requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning
customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual
instruction and study in an institution of higher learning or a hospital, as
distinguished from a general academic education or from an apprenticeship or
from training in the performance of routine mental, manual, or physical
processes; or (b) any employee, who (i) has completed the courses of
specialized intellectual instruction and study described in clause (iv) of
paragraph (a), and (ii) is performing related work under the supervision of a
professional person to qualify himself to become a professional employee as
defined in paragraph (a).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1) (1994). The Act provides that if a unit includes both
professional and non-professional employees, then the unit cannot be certified unless a
majority of such professional employees vote for inclusion. Id. This is to insure that
professionals want to be unionized, because collective agreements may not suit their needs.
Id.
36. S. REP. No. 80-105, at 19 (1947).
37. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
38. Id. at 681.
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The Board looks to section 2(11) in ascertaining whether an employee is a
supervisor within the meaning of the Act. The Board has distinguished
between a professional's non-supervisory exercise of authority related to
the employee's professional functions, and the exercise of real supervisory
authority to affect conditions of employment.39
In Yeshiva, the Supreme Court seemingly rejected the distinction
created by the Board.40 The Board previously held that university
professors who exercised independent judgment in determining curriculum,
grading systems, admission, and other academic policies were not excluded
41because they were supervisors. The Board also held that the faculty
exercised this independent judgment in its own professional interest and
not in the interest of its employer.42 The Supreme Court rejected this
distinction and held that the faculty interests could not be separated from
those of the university.43 Although the Court found that these particular
employees were supervisors, it did not rule that all professionals were
supervisors and, therefore, excluded from the Act's coverage.44 The Court
held that it would consider professional duties to be managerial only if they
fell outside the scope of duties "routinely performed by similarly situated
professionals. ''4 Recognizing the difference between the routine discharge
of professional duties and the exercise of real supervisory authority, the
Court looked to cases dealing with architects and engineers.46 It is
interesting to note that the Yeshiva opinion not only acknowledges the
"incidental to patient care" test used by the Board at that time to determine
if nurses were supervisors, but appears to endorse it.47 The Court later
reversed this endorsement in NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of
America4 8 and declared the "incidental to patient care" test invalid and
inconsistent with the NLRA.49  However, the Court did not overtly
acknowledge this reversal in its Health Care opinion.50
C. The 1974 NLRA Amendments
In 1974 Congress amended the NLRA to cover private profit and non-
39. Benedetto, supra note 22, at 705.
40. 444 U.S. at 672.
41. Id. at 679. The faculty committees also made recommendations to the
administration regarding faculty hiring and tenure. Id. at 677.
42. Id. at 688.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 681-82.
45. Id. at 690.
46. Id. at 690 n.30.
47. Id.
48. 511 U.S. 571 (1994).
49. Id. at 576.
50. See id.
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profit hospitals. Congress could see no reason for excluding these
employees since the NLRA covers all industries involved in interstate
commerce.5 2 The amendments were designed to end labor problems at
hospitals and other health care facilities. 3 By this time, hospitals had
become big business and were experiencing labor strife in the early
1970s. 4 By giving the employees a voice, the potential for strikes
decreases. When Congress decided to amend the NLRA, its intention was
to protect health care professionals from being unfairly excluded as
supervisors under the NLRA. 5' However, by not explicitly stating this in
the amendment, over twenty years after its passage, nurses in some circuits
are being excluded as supervisors
5 6
During the hearings for these amendments, the American Nurses
Association ("ANA") and others expressed concern that if the definition of
"supervisor" is read broadly, then nurses would be automatically classified
as supervisors under the NLRA because they are required by state licensing
laws to exercise judgment with respect to patients' needs.57 However this
would defy Congress' original intention that nurses be considered
professionals and be covered by the Act unless they exercise authority not
typically associated with other similar professionals.
The Committee on Labor and Public Welfare (the "Committee")
considered adopting an amendment specifying its intent to cover health
care professionals." However, the Committee reports stated that a specific
amendment was not necessary.59 The Committee's opinion was based on
previous Board decisions which held that these professionals were not
51. Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
52. The legislative history reveals that "[t]he Committee could find no acceptable
reason why 1,427,012 employees of non-profit, non-public hospitals, representing 56% of
all hospital employees, should continue to be excluded from the coverage and protections of
the Act." S. REP. No. 93-766, at 3 (1974).
53. 120 CONG. REc. 12,934 (1974). The amendment was designed to help hospitals,
falling on difficult times. Many lobbied that the amendment would help ease the difficulties
of these non-profit organization. Id. at 12,941.
54. Id. at 12,937. See generally, Elizabeth Grace, House-Staff Officers: Collective
Bargaining in the Health Care System, 2 J. LEGAL MED. 415, 417-18 (1981). The final goal
of the amendments was to establish a uniform set of rules that would apply to all health care
institutions. 120 CONG. REc. 12,934 (1974).
55. Straight, supra note 30, at 1938.
56. See generally Passavant Ret. & Health Ctr. v. NLRB, 149 F.3d 243 (3rd Cir. 1998);
Mid-America Care Found. v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 1998); NLRB v. St. Mary's
Home, Inc., 690 F.2d 1062 (4th Cir. 1982).
57. Extension of NLRA to Non-Profit Hospital Employees: Hearings on H.R. 1236
Before the Special Subcomm. on Education and Labor, 93rd Cong. 21-24 (1973).
58. Straight, supra note 30, at 1938.
59. Id.
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supervisors. 60  The Committee expressed approval of the Board's
distinction between a health care professional, who gives direction to others
based on professional judgment, and one who exercises supervisory
authority solely in the interests of the employer.1 The Committee went on
to conclude that it intended for the Board to continue to evaluate health
62care cases in this manner. Although the Supreme Court in Health Care
would later rule that these committee reports do not carry the weight of
law,63 they remain a profound expression of Congress' intent to exclude
health care professionals from the definition of "supervisor."
In the Health Care decision, the Supreme Court refused to give weight
to those committee statements (and therefore refused to give deference to
the Board) despite law to the contrary. 64 The Court has held that when
Congress re-enacts a statute and falls to revise an agency's interpretation of
that statute, that is evidence that the agency's current interpretation is
Congress's intention.6' Although the "incidental to patient care" test used
by the Board was later declared invalid, the plain intent of Congress to
have nurses excluded from the definition of "supervisor" should be noted.
The Supreme Court declared the test utilized by the NLRB to be invalid,
not the policy that Congress wanted nurses included in the Act.66 It is
unfortunate that Congress found it unnecessary to specifically exclude
nurses as supervisors. Congress lacked the foresight to realize that exactly
twenty years later the Supreme Court would invalidate the test67 it relied on
and put the status of nurses into question for years to come.
I. "INCIDENTAL TO PATIENT CARE" TEST AND THE SUPREME COURT'S
INVALIDATION IN NLRB v. HEALTH CARE & RETIREMENT CORP. OF
AMERICA
A. Circuit Split After the 1974 Amendments
After the passage of the 1974 amendments, the Board interpreted the
first prong of the analysis to declare that nurses were not supervisors. The
Board consistently held that nurses exercised professional judgment when
60. S. REP. No. 93-766, at 6 (1974).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 511 U.S. 571,582 (1994).
64. Id. at 582-583.
65. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274-75 (1974); Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969) (emphasizing the fact that Congress refused to amend
the statue when it re-enacted it).
66. Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1784.
67. See id.
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they directed other employees and not supervisory authority as required
under the NLRA.6 The Board's rationale in upholding this distinction and
giving effect to the congressional intent that nurses are not supervisors
manifested itself in the "incidental to patient care" test. The "incidental to
patient care" test asks whether an employee directs others incidental to the
professional's treatment of patients or in the interest of the employer.69 The
Board used this test to effectuate Congress' intent when it passed the
supervisory exclusion in 1947.70 Congress intended, and the Board found,
that only when nurses possess real authority to fire, promote, and discipline
should they be designated as supervisors.71
The Supreme Court eventually held that the "incidental to patient
care" test utilized by the Board represented an attempt to afford special
treatment to nurses and displayed the bias of the Board toward granting
non-supervisory status.72 However, this argument overlooks the fact that
the Board has utilized this test outside of the health care field.73 The Board
has applied this test to architects, engineers, editors, and television
directors.74 Therefore, by declaring that nurses are not supervisors, the
Board is not displaying bias. It is merely giving weight to the distinction
Congress developed between straw bosses and those which actually side
with management, whether they be nurses, architects, or lawyers.
In the early eighties, the Sixth Circuit refused to apply the "incidental
68. Beverly Enters., 313 N.L.R.B. 491, 493 (1993).
69. Newton-Wellesley Hosp., 219 N.L.R.B. 699, 700 (1975). Other cases have also
applied the "incidental to patient care" test. See Waverly-Cedar Falls Health Care, Inc., 297
N.L.R.B. 390, 393 (1989) (declaring nurses not to be supervisors because they exercised
authority in the interest of patients, and not the employer); Pontiac Osteopathic Hosp., 284
N.L.R.B. 442, 450 (1987); Brattleboro Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1036, 1038 (1976);
Sutter Community Hosps., 227 N.L.R.B. 181, 192 (1976) (holding that nurses' duties are
performed incidental to the treatment of patients and they do not possess any of the
traditional authority of supervisors); Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 218 N.L.R.B. 1266, 1268
(1975) (holding that duties limited to giving directions in performance of professional duties
is not equivalent to statutory duties of supervisors under the NLRA); Valley Hosp., Ltd.,
220 N.L.R.B. 1339, 1341 (1975) (using the "incidental to patient care" test to find that
nurses are not supervisors).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1994).
71. Beverly Enters., 313 N.L.R.B. at 494 (holding that the authority of more skilled
employees to direct others in the interest of providing better care is not supervisory in
nature, but is an assumption of their professional duty).
72. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 576, 583.
73. See generally David M. Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded Managers from Covered
Professionals Under the NLRA, 89 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1775, 1796 (1989) (discussing the
Board's development and use of an "incidental to professional work" analysis, particularly
in the context of college and university faculty members).
74. Keller, supra note 29, at 590 n.76 (1996) (noting, for example, that editors actions
fall within news writing professionalism and not supervisory authority) (citing Washington
Post Co., 254 N.L.R.B. 168, 205 (1981); Ohio State Legal Servs. Ass'n, 239 N.L.R.B. 594,
598 (1978) (holding that lawyers are not supervisors)).
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to patient care" test in NLRB v. Beacon Light Christian Nursing Home,75
ruling that it was inconsistent with the NLRA.76  In Beacon Light, the
Board determined that Licensed Practical Nurses ("LPNs") directed aides
in the interest of patient care, and not in the interest of the employer.77 It is
important to note that, prior to Beacon Light, the NLRB had used the
"independent judgment" test to determine if nurses were supervisors, but
then switched to the "incidental to patient care" test following the Yeshiva
case. This provides further evidence that the Board was not biased, and
did not flip-flop tests just to declare that nurses are not supervisors.
In Beacon Light, the Board utilized the "incidental to patient care"
test, and the Sixth Circuit reversed.79 However, the court held that "where
nurses otherwise meet the statutory definition of supervisors, they are not
disqualified because the activity they are supervising is patient care."80
This analysis somewhat misses the point. The Board was trying to rule that
the nurses were not supervising at all, but merely exercising their
professional duties.
Following their rationale in Beacon Light, the Sixth Circuit took one
more swing at the "incidental to patient care" test in Beverly California
Corp. v. NLRB.s' The issue in that case was whether a group of Registered
Nurses ("RNs") were considered supervisors under the NLRA . The
Board had found that they were not supervisors because their duties were
generally limited to directing the quality treatment of patients, and did not
include the supervisory duties envisioned by the NLRA.3  The Sixth
Circuit overturned the Board's order and held that, as a "matter of
economics," the interests of the employer were the best interests of the
patients as well. 84 The court went on to conclude that the use of
independent judgment is not merely routine just because it is exercised in
75. 825 F.2d 1076 (6th Cir. 1987).
76. Id. at 1079.
77. Id.
78. See Keller, supra note 29, at 593.
79. Beacon Light, 825 F.2d at 1076.
80. See Barker, supra note 31, at 374 (1996) (citing Beacon Light, 825 F.2d at 1079).
81. 970 F.2d 1548 (6th Cir. 1992).
82. Id. at 1548-49.
83. Id. at 1549.
84. Id. at 1552. The court stated that:
[u]nder the statute .... the question is whether the individual has "authority,"
pure and simple, responsibility to direct others in the interest of the employer-
and the notion that direction given to subordinate personnel to ensure that the
employer's nursing home customers receive "quality care" somehow fails to
qualify as direction given in the interest of the employer, makes very little sense
to us.
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the interests of patients.8
Again, this misreads the Board's intended meaning. The Board was
arguing that the nurses did not exercise independent judgment at all
because their duties were based on professional norms, and not supervisory
authority.86 Congress, by believing a specific health care amendment was
unnecessary in 1974, thought there was a well-settled distinction between
professional duties and supervisory authority. 7 The Board was trying to
give effect to that distinction by separating duties exercised in a
professional capacity as opposed to duties which directly further
management's objectives.
While some have criticized the Board for flip-flopping tests, one
rarely hears about the Sixth Circuit's flip-flop in declaring the "incidental
to patient care" test invalid. The Sixth Circuit in Beverly Enterprises v.
NLRB88 remanded the case to determine if LPNs were supervisors. The
court stated that LPNs were not supervisors because they either did not
exercise independent judgment, or their independent judgment was
exercised professionally, not because the judgment was in the interest of
the employer.90 This case expanded the use of the "incidental to patient
care" test to LPNs.9' The court attempted to reconcile its decision in
Beverly Enterprises with its later decision in Beverly California, but some
still do not believe the two can be read consistently.
92
An overwhelming number of circuits had approved the "incidental to
patient care" test before the Supreme Court declared it invalid. The
Seventh Circuit in NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc.93 ruled that the LPNs in question
did not have formal authority to hire, fire, or promote and, therefore, were
not supervisors. 94 It agreed with the Board's determination that the NLRA
was not intended to exclude all employees with supervisory power, but
only those vested with managerial judgment as to the interests of the
employer." In the companion case of NLRB v. American Medical Services,
Inc. ,96 the court held that RNs were supervisors because their authority was
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1552, 1553.
87. Keller, supra note 29, at 588; see also S. REP. No. 93-766, at 6 (1974).
88. 661 F.2d 1095 (6th Cir. 1981).
89. Id. at 1101.
90. Id.
91. Beverly Cal. Corp., 970 F.2d at 1553-54.
92. Id.
93. 705 F.2d 1461 (7th Cir. 1983).
94. Id. at 1466.
95. Id. at 1467. It is important to note that the court came to this conclusion despite the
fact that the LPNs were the highest-ranking employees at the nursing home during their
shift. Id.
96. 705 F.2d 1472 (7th Cir. 1983).
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more than "ministerial"--it truly was supervisory in nature.97 However, the
court maintained the distinction between truly supervisory authority and the
authority exercised as a matter of professionalism.98 True supervisory
authority was found to exist in this case.99
The Fourth Circuit in NLRB v. St May's Home, Inc.'0° also ruled that
nurses were considered supervisors, but it upheld the "incidental to patient
care" test.'01  The court held that, because the LPNs had complete
responsibility of the home, they possessed the necessary authority to be
defined as "supervisors."'0 2  However, the court upheld the distinction
between judgment based on professional service and judgment which is
exercised in addition to their professional services.0 3
In Misericordia Hospital Medical Center v. NLRB,'O° the Second
Circuit ruled that a head nurse was not a supervisor under the NLRA
0 5
The nurse did not have full responsibility for the unit, but instead reported
to the Director of Nursing' °6  The court distinguished between the
responsibility to maintain patient care and responsibility to supervise
employees. 0 7
The Eighth Circuit also upheld the Board's "incidental to patient care"
test in Waverly-Cedar Falls Health Care Center v. NLRB.10 8 The court
ruled that LPNs were not supervisors because their duties called for
professional judgment in the interests of patients, and not judgment as to
the employer's best interest. °9 It relied on the distinction between those
that carry out the policies of management and those who actually design
and effectuate management policies."°
97. Id. at 1474. The court also relied on the ratio of supervisors to employees test. If
the RNs were not considered supervisors, then the ratio of supervisors to employees would
be one in twenty-seven, compared to one in eight in the Res-Care case. Id. at 1466, 1473.
98. Id.
99. Id. Unlike the nurses in Res-Care, the nurses here were in charge. In fact, months
at a time would pass before the nurses had any contact with the supervisor above them. Id.
at 1473.
100. 690 F.2d 1062 (4th Cir. 1982).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1067.
103. Id. at 1067-68.
104. 623 F.2d 808 (2d Cir. 1980).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 816.
107. Id. at 810, 816.
108. 933 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1991).
109. Id. at 630.
110. Id. The court followed the Res-Care decision and declared that the nurses were not
supervisors even though at times they were the highest-ranking employees on the premises.
There was always someone higher who could be reached by phone and any decisions made
were based on routine procedures and not independent judgment. Id.
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Finally, in NLRB v. Doctors' Hospital of Modesto,' the Ninth Circuit
expressed approval for the NLRB's "incidental to patient care" test.112 The
court held that the nurses in question were not supervisors because they
gave minor orders and were not an integral part of management.1 13 Taking
it one step further, the court stated that the use of occasional independent
judgment by professionals does not render them supervisors under the
Act.!
14
On the eve of the Supreme Court's decision in 1994 that declared the
"incidental to patient care" test invalid, there was a circuit split over the
test. The Second, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits all
approved the test and held it consistent with the policies of the NLRA.15
The Sixth Circuit was the lone dissenter, and, as we have seen, its position
was not consistent through the years 1 6 Of the Circuits that adopted the
test, only two held nurses to be supervisors under the "incidental to patient
care!' test." 7 Based on this breakdown, one can conclude that the Board did
not have a hidden agenda in declaring all nurses supervisors when it
established the "incidental to patient care" test; it merely tried to resolve
the tension between professionals and supervisors.
B. The Supreme Court's Decision in NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement
Corp. of America Invalidates the "Incidental to Patient Care" Test
In this landmark decision, the Supreme Court was reviewing a
decision by the NLRB, which found that LPNs were not supervisors under
the NLRA.118 Three nurses who were discharged brought unfair labor
practice charges against the nursing home." 9 The employer argued that the
nurses did not have a remedy because they were not employees under the
Act, but supervisors. 0 The Board, applying the patient care analysis, held
that the nurses' duties were those of a minor supervisory employee and,
therefore, not meant to be excluded by the Act. 21
The Board's "incidental to patient care" test arose from its
interpretation of the NLRA; therefore, the standard of review imposed by
111. 489 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1973).
112. Id. at 776.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Straight, supra note 30, at 1940.
116. Id. at 1940, 1941.
117. The Seventh and Second Circuits, in Am. Med. Sens., Inc. and St. Mary's Home,
Inc., respectively, ruled that under the "incidental to patient care" test, the nurses in question
were supervisors.
118. NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571,575 (1994).
119. Id. at 574.
120. Id. at 575.
121. Id.
2001]
684 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 3:3
the Supreme Court was whether the test was rational and consistent with
the Act.122 In a five-to four decision the Supreme Court ruled that the
"incidental to patient care" test was inconsistent with the NLRA.'23 The
Court relied on Yeshiva and held that the false dichotomy of patients'
interests and employer interests could not be squared with the language of
the NLRA' 24 The Court reasoned that patient care is the business of the
employer and, therefore, when nurses attend to the needs of patients, they
are acting in the interest of the employer.12 However, as Justice Ginsburg
points out in her dissent, the Court in Yeshiva expressly approves the
Board's test as consistent with the NLRA. 26
The conclusion that employee and employer interests always coincide
is far too simplistic for a professional employee. A professional employee
usually has a code of ethics within his or her given field that regulates the
field, and often one's allegiance to it may conflict with managerial business
objectives. 27 Oftentimes, nurses are asked to mediate the difference
between bottom-line management objectives and the best care for their
patients.
28
The Health Care Court rejected all inferences the Board made to the
legislative history of the Act, even though its analysis addresses whether
the interpretation is consistent with the Act. The Court rejected the
committee reports which stated Congress' views that a specific health care
amendment was unnecessary because of the Board's existing decisions. 29
The Court reasoned that "[i]t is the function of the courts and not the
Legislature, much less a Committee of one House of the Legislature ... to
say what an enacted statute means. 1 30 This statement is harsh, for it is
Congress who wrote the law, and its intent regarding the law's meaning
should weigh into the Court's analysis. While it may not carry the full
weight of law, it should weigh heavily in the interpretation of who the
Act was intended to include and exclude.
122. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27,42 (1987).
123. Id. at 576-77.
124. Straight, supra note 30, at 1943 (citing Yeshiva, 444 U.S. 672 (1980)). The Court in
Yeshiva had ruled that the distinction between the interests of professionals and the interests
of the employer made no sense. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 672.
125. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 577.
126. Keller, supra note 29, at 600 n.144.
127. Hilary Jewett, Professionals in the Health Care Industry: A Reconsideration of
NLRA Coverage of Housestaff, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 1125, 1134 (1997).
128. Id. at 1134-35. For example, when a policy is profitable economically, but is not
wise in terms of quality patient care, a divergence occurs. If nurses are considered
supervisors, then they have to follow management prerogatives because they are not
protected by the Act. This may severely compromise patient care. Id. at 1134, 1144.
129. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 581-82.
130. Id. at 582 (citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552,556 (1988)).
131. Id.
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The Court rejected all of the policy arguments that the Board raised.
The Court expressed concern that there would be divided loyalty if the
nurses were deemed not to be supervisors. 32 As I will discuss later, the
deference afforded to the Board's factual findings by the Court in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council133 preempts the Court
from merely arriving at a different conclusion.34
The final problem the Court had with the Board's "incidental to
patient care" test was that it was only utilized in the health care field.
135
The Court found that in all other industries where the Board distinguished
between professional knowledge and management prerogatives, it did not
rely on the phrase "in the interest of the employer. 1 36 This is an extreme
example of a court relying on form over substance. Although the Board
may not have used the exact words "in the interest of the employer," there
are many decisions that distinguish between professional judgment and
supervisory authority. 37 Therefore, the Court's prediction that its holding
would not have far-reaching consequences outside the health field is
mistaken.
The Court concluded that its holding was limited to the "incidental to
patient care" test and did not stand for the proposition that all nurses were
supervisors. 3 The Court stated in dicta that the Board cannot manipulate
the phrase "in the interest of the employer" to arrive at the conclusion that
nurses are not supervisors. 39 Leaving the door wide open, the Court found
that other language in the definition of supervisor was ambiguous and,
therefore, subject to the Board's interpretation.' 40
132. Id. at 583.
133. 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) (granting broad deference to agency decisions where
Congress has not clearly spoken on the matter).
134. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274-75 (1974) (stating that "great
weight" is to be given to an agency's interpretation if Congress fails to modify such
interpretation when passing the amending legislation; here, the amending legislation was the
1974 health care amendments to the NLRA).
135. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 582.
136. Id.
137. See e.g., Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., Inc., 215 N.L.R.B. 123, 126 (1974)
(holding that employees of television stations-including staff, freelance producers,
directors, associate and assistant directors--constitute units appropriate for collective
bargaining); General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 857 (1974) (noting that
"managerial authority is not vested in professional employees merely by virtue of their
professional status..."); Wurtser, Bemardi, & Emmons, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. 1049, 1051
(1971) (finding that professional architectural employees "have a sufficient community of
interest to constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining").
138. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 583-84.
139. Id. at583.
140. Id. at 579 (holding that the language "independent judgment" and "responsibly to
direct" is ambiguous, and, therefore, the Board should have room to interpret these terms).
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C. Justice Ginsburg's Dissent
Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Health Care emphasized that separating
supervisors from professionals, under the Act, is a task that "Congress
committed to the National Labor Relations Board., 141 Along with Justices
Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter, Ginsburg's dissent poignantly emphasized
the deference that the Board deserves. The dissent found the Board's
"incidental to patient care" test rational and consistent with the NLRA.142
Justice Ginsburg, unlike the majority, gave proper weight to the
legislative history of the NLRA. She cited the Senate and House reports,
which illustrated the intent of Congress not to include minor supervisory
employees within the definition of "supervisor." 143 Particularly persuasive
are the statements of the author who inserted the words "responsible to
direct" into the 1947 amendment. 144 The author explained that only
employees who have essential management duties and rank above the level
of straw bosses and other minor supervisory employees are supervisors.
141
The dissent probed behind the actual words "in the interest of the
employer" and identified the policy the Board used to determine
supervisory status. 146 The key question the Board was asking in order to
determine supervisory status was whether an employee possesses key
managerial authority or merely control attributable to her professional
status.' 47  Despite the label "incidental to patient care test," Justice
Ginsburg recognized the policy behind it and, therefore, came to the correct
conclusion that the "test" is used in a variety of fields.148
Justice Ginsburg also points out that Yeshiva can be reconciled with
the "incidental to patient care" test. 49 In Yeshiva, the Court acknowledged
141. Id. at 585. The dissent states that since Congress delegated this responsibility to the
NLRB, its rulings should not be disturbed unless they are not rational or consistent with the
NLRA. Id. at 586.
142. Id. at 586.
143. Id. at 587 (citing S. REP. No. 80-105, at 19 (1947)). The Senate Committee Report
states that the definition of a supervisor has to be framed to assure that "the employees
excluded from coverage of the act [would] be truly supervisory." Id.
144. 93 CONG. REc. 4678 (1947).
145. Id. (remarks of Sen. Flanders).
146. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 585-86.
147. Id. at 590.
148. Id. at 591-92. Ginsburg cites a number of cases where the Board has employed the
same distinction between professionalism and supervisors. Id. nn.6-12. See generally
Detroit Coll. of Bus., 296 N.L.R.B. 318 (1989); Marymount Coll. of Va., 280 N.L.R.B. 486
(1986); Youth Guidance Ctr., 263 N.L.R.B. 1330 (1982); Say-On Drugs, Inc., 243 N.L.R.B.
859 (1979); Neighborhood Legal Serv., Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 1269 (1978); Golden-West
Broadcasters-KTLA, 215 N.L.R.B. 760 (1974).
149. Keller, supra note 29, at 603 (discussing how the faculty members in Yeshiva had
absolute power in all academic matters, and how the LPNs' authority was severely limited).
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the distinction between professional and supervisory judgment.1 50 The
Yeshiva Court declared that "employees whose decisionmaking is limited
to routine discharge of professional duties... cannot be excluded from
coverage .... Only if an employees' activities fall outside the scope of the
duties routinely performed by similarly situated professionals will he be
found aligned with management."' '  The dissent argued that the
"incidental to patient care" test is merely a replication of this distinction,
acknowledged in Yeshiva.
15 2
The dissent concluded that the majority's opinion will have
implications that stretch beyond the health care field because the Board's
analysis is utilized in many professional fields. 53 As the courts broaden the
definition of supervisor, they will decrease the number of employees
protected as professionals under the Act. 54 The broad definition of
"supervisor" will be applied to all professional employees because the
"incidental to patient care" test was just another name for the independent
analysis the Board had been conducting.
1 55
The Supreme Court's invalidation of the "incidental to patient care"
test has cast a large cloud over whether nurses are considered supervisors.
This dark cloud has extended to other professions as well, notably doctors.
As will be discussed later, it is now more difficult for doctors to organize,
and, in that respect, Justice Ginsburg was correct in her prediction.
15 6
The majority's main concern in Health Care was that the "incidental
to patient care" test would eventually lead to all nurses being deemed non-
supervisory. 5 7 First, that may not be a bad thing. After all, Congress, in
the committee reports which the Court wished to dismiss, implicitly
approved that concept.158  Secondly, the majority fails to perceive the
potential consequence of their invalidation-all professionals are now in
danger of being excluded from protection of the Act.
150. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 690 (1980).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 691-706 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 605.
154. Id.
155. Barker, supra note 31, at 363.
156. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 598-99.
157. Id. at 579.
158. S. REP. No. 93-766, at 6 (1974). Congress implicitly approved the concept of
nurses being considered non-supervisors by stating that a specific health care amendment,
exempting nurses from the definition of supervisor, was unnecessary given existing Board
decisions. Id.
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I. THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT CAUSED BY NLRB v. HEALTH CARE &
RETIREMENT CORP. OF AMERICA
A. Predictions After the Supreme Court Decision
The NLRB and nurses everywhere feared that the Health Care
decision would quash attempts by nurses and other professionals to
effectively unionize.5 9 Although the majority predicted that the decision
would have no effect outside of the health care context, many still
worried. 16 Indeed, there have been some residual effects, as I will discuss
later, in physician unionization.
Despite the setback in Health Care, nurses continue to unionize and
fight for their rights under the NLRA161 The Board simply returned to the
test it used prior to the patient care analysis. The prior test asked whether
or not nurses exercise independent judgment in directing others or, instead,
162use professional norms. The "independent judgment" analysis asks
whether the employee uses independent judgment or whether her/his
direction to others is merely routine. 63 The Board distinguished between
decisions that required individual discretion and those which were dictated
by company policy, and were thus not decisions at all.' 64 However, by
leaving open the question of what constitutes independent judgment, the
Supreme Court once again split the circuits over whether or not nurses are
supervisors.1 65
Some say that the "independent judgment" test is an attempt by the
Board to circumvent the Health Care decision and declare that nurses are
159. Keller, supra note 29, at 604-05 n.177.
160. See generally id. at 582-87.
161. Peter Macleod, Status of Nurses as "Supervisors" Under the National Laboi
Relations Act: Nymed Inc., 38 B.C. L. REv. 323, 326 (1997).
162. Id.
163. Nymed Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 806, 810 (1996).
164. Providence Hosp., 320 N.L.R.B. 717, 726-27 (1996).
165. Nymed Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. at 810. The Supreme Court stated that the term
"independent judgment" was ambiguous and the Board needed wide latitude in applying it
to various industries. The Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have lined up against the
"independent judgment" test and the Eighth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits have
accepted the test. Passavant Ret. & Health Ctr. v. NLRB, 149 F.3d 243 (3rd Cir. 1998)
(rejecting the "independent judgment" test); Edgewood Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB, 142
F.3d 433, 1998 WL 96595, at *4 (6th Cir. Feb. 24, 1998) (unpublished opinion) (rejecting
the "independent judgment" test); NLRB v. Grancare, Inc., 158, F.3d 407 (7th Cir. 1998)
(rejecting the "independent judgment" test); Beverly Enters. v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 1042, 1045
(8th Cir. 1998) (accepting the "independent judgment" test); Providence Alaska Med. Ctr.
V. NLRB, 121 F.3d 548, 549 (9th Cir. 1997) (accepting the "independent judgment" test);
Beverly Enters.-Pennsylvania, Inc. v. NLRB 129 F.3d 1269, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(accepting the "independent judgment" test).
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not supervisors. 166 However, the test was already in place before the Board
switched to the patient care analysis. 67 Also, the various tests are merely
attempts by the Board to effectuate the intent of Congress not to include
those who exercise professional judgment in the definition of
"supervisors.' 68 Perhaps it is time for critics to realize that the reason why
nurses are consistently held by the Board not to be supervisors is not due to
the bias of the Board, but the fact that they truly are not supervisors within
the meaning of the NLRA. The fact that the Board consistently finds
nurses not to be supervisors, the deference entitled to them, and the
legislative history and congressional intent of the Act should be utilized in
an effort to resolve the current circuit split.
B. The Early Cases After the Health Care Decision.
In one of the first decisions after the Health Care case, the Board and
the Ninth Circuit held that the nurses in question were not supervisors. In
Providence Alaska Medical Center v. NLRB, 169 the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the nurses duties were neither clerical nor supervisory.17 In that case,
the title of "charge nurse" rotated among the RNs in dispute whenever the
supervisory RN was not available. 71 The charge nurse's duties included
coordinating work schedules and making overtime assignments.
7 2
However, the supervisory RN always prepared the monthly work
schedule.77 Therefore, the Board concluded that these duties did not
include the exercise of independent judgment. 74 The Board held that it
was not the intention of the Act to have every act of assignment constitute
166. See Keller, supra, note 29, at 617-20.
167. Id. at 593.
168. See S. REP. No. 80-105, at 3-4 (1947). The committee stated:
[we are) not unmindful of the fact that certain employees with minor
supervisory duties have problems which may justify their inclusion in that act.
It has therefore distinguished between straw bosses, leadmen, set-up men, and
other minor supervisory employees on one hand and a supervisor vested with
true, genuine management prerogatives.
Id.
169. 121 F.3d 548 (9th Cir. 1997).
170. Id. at 551-54. The Ninth Circuit deferred to the Board's interpretation to determine
if an employee is a supervisor. The Board utilized a number of guiding principles which
included: length of time spent supervising, the skill levels of those being directed, and the
routine nature of the tasks. Id.
171. Id. at 551.
172. Id.
173. Providence Hosp., 320 N.L.R.B. 717,725 (1996).
174. Id. The Board stated that it is critical to explain the nurses' authority without
detracts from the professional responsibility of a RN for patient care. Id. See also King,
supra note 3, at 349.
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supervisory authority.1 75 It then turned its analysis to the term "responsibly
to direct.,176 The Board noted the difference between a professional giving
direction and a supervisor that performs one of the twelve enumerated
functions in section 2(11).
177
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Board and held that the nurses did
not exercise independent judgment because they must work within the
supervisory nurse's parameters when assigning work. 78 Therefore, their
authority was more clerical than supervisory.' 79  The Ninth Circuit
promulgated a test to determine whether nurses were supervisors. 80 The
test asks whether an employee represents the interests of the employer vis-
t-vis other employees and, therefore, is not perceived as one of the other
employees who gave routine directions. 8' The Board and the Court
determined that "work assignments made to equalize employee's work on a
rotational or other rational basis are routine assignments... [and] not
necessarily supervisory.' 82 The Board also argued that if one employee
directs another to perform tasks stemming from one's own experience and
higher skill level, that direction is not supervisory. 1
3
It is clear that reasonable people can disagree whether certain duties
rise to the level of independent judgment, even when given the same set of
facts. A strong dissent was filed in this case which argued that the
professional judgment used by the nurses rose to the level of supervisory
authority.' 84 The dissent argued that the Board was manipulating the
phrase "independent judgment," just as it tried to manipulate the phrase "in
the interest of the employer."' 85
175. Providence Hosp., 320 N.L.R.B. at 727.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 730. The Board held that "the essence of professionalism requires the
exercise of expert judgment and the essence of supervision requires the exercise of
independent judgment.... [T]he alleged supervisory independent judgment of charge
nurses when examined in detail becomes indistinguishable from the professional judgment
exercised by all RNs." Id.
178. Providence Alaska Med. Ctr., 121 F.3d at 551-54.
179. Id. at 553.
180. See generally id. at 551-55.
181. King, supra note 3, at 351. This test achieves the congressional policy of not
including minor supervisory employees in the statutory definition of "supervisor." Id.
182. Providence Hosp., 320 N.L.R.B. at 731.
183. Id. at 729. An example the Board utilizes is that of a surgeon directing his/her
assistants during a surgery. This type of direction is not supervisory, but comes from
professional expertise in work. Id. at 718.
184. Id. at 736. The Board went on to state that the charge nurse's approval of break
requests was based on her view of the workload of the entire unit, not on her view of her
own workload, and, therefore, was a routine clerical judgment. Id. at 732.
185. Id. (Cohen, M., dissenting). Cohen declared that the Board had ignored the
substantial independent judgment that the nurses utilized in order to "transform charge
nurses into employees." Id. at 737.
690
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On the heels of the Providence Hospital decision regarding RNs, the
Board decided another case: Nymed, Inc. 116 This latter case dealt with
forty-five LPNs who performed duties that included updating patient
information, completing approvals for long-term plans for residents, and
performing certain medical treatments. 87 The Board first looked at the
authority of the LPNs to assign work.' The Board held that the
assignments were routine because they were based on a set rotation dictated
by management.'89 Plus, there was little independent judgment required
because all of the certified nursing assistants ("CNAs") possessed equal
skill levels.' 9 The Board then examined the circumstances in which the
LPNs direct the CNAs work and concluded that no independent judgment
was utilized due to the repetitiveness of their duties.' 9'
Unlike Providence, the Board in this case examined other indicia of
supervisory authority. The Board found that the LPNs did not discipline or
effectively recommend disciplinary action because their reports were mere
recommendations.192 The head nurses and supervisory personnel reviewed
the reports and maintained authority to discipline as they saw fit. 93 The
Board concluded that this lack of immediate action rendered the nurses'
recommendations not supervisory in nature. 94 Using a similar rationale,
the Board also found that the nurses' ability to transfer aides was not
supervisory because ultimate responsibility for the transfer lay above
them.' 95
The dissent in this case stated that the Board was stretching the
language of section 2(11) in order to exclude nurses from the definition of
supervisors. 96  The dissent argued that the nurses did effectively
recommend discipline because the head nurse usually did not conduct an
independent investigation and usually relied on the LPN's report.
197
However, the dissent missed the Board's point that the LPNs did not have
the discretion or authority to enact disciplinary measures because the head
nurse retained that right. Whether or not the head nurse followed the
186. 320 N.L.R.B. 806 (1996).
187. Id. at 807-09.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 810.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 811. The Board stated that because of the charge nurse's additional duties, the
employer intended the direction of the aides to be narrowly circumscribed, general, and
routine. Id. n.9.
192. Id. at 812.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 813 (finding that the transfers of aides were based on all factors involved and
not just the recommendation of the LPN).
196. Id. at 814 (Cohen, J., dissenting).
197. Id.
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LPN's recommendation was subject to the whims of that particular head
nurse; therefore, it can hardly be said that the LPNs recommend discipline.
This dissent exemplifies the trend of examining the same set of facts and
coming to exactly the opposite conclusion. 98
It was apparent that even after the Health Care decision, the Board
was not going to declare nurses supervisors. The Nymed and Providence
Hospital cases set forth the "independent judgment" test that the Board
would use to decide future cases involving health care supervisors. By
utilizing the "independent judgment" test, the Board is trying to further the
congressional intent not to include minor supervisory employees in the
definition of supervisor. However, some circuits have overruled the Board,
despite the deference it is due, and declared nurses to be supervisors.'99
Here, again, we find a circuit split that is ripe for congressional amendment
or a Supreme Court decision.
IV. THE CURRENT CIRcurr SPLIT & NLRB V. HILLIARD DEVELOPMENT
CORP.
A. The Third Circuit
The Third Circuit in Passavant Retirement & Health Center v.
NLRB2° overruled the Board20 ' and found the disputed nurses to be
202
supervisors under the NLRA. In Passavant, the charge nurses in
question oversaw the work of the aides, but were supervised by head
nurses.2°3 The Board held that they were not supervisors even though they
could send aides home for flagrant conduct violations such as resident
204
abuse. The Board found that this limited authority was not enough to
warrant the label of "supervisor." 205 However, the Third Circuit overruled
the Board and cited a non-health care case where this type of authority was
198. Jonathan Edward Motley, Grandmothers and Teamsters: How the NLRB's New
Approach to the Supervisory Status of Charge Nurses Ignores the Reality of the Nursing
Home, 73 IND. L.J. 711, 736 (1998) (stating that "[t]he majority and dissenting opinions
seem to describe two completely different sets of employees and duties even though they
address exactly the same charge nurses")
199. See, e.g., Glenmark Assoc. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 1998); Mid-Am. Care
Found. v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 1998); Passavant Ret. & Health Ctr. v. NLRB, 149
F.3d 243 (3rd Cir. 1998).
200. 149 F.3d 243 (3rd Cir. 1998).
201. Passavant Ret. & Health Ctr., 323 N.L.R.B. 598 (1997).
202. Passavant, 149 F.3d at 245.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 245, 248.
205. Id. at 248.
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held to be supervisory in nature.2° The case cited by the court does not
take into account the unique character of the health care field, and there are
many other cases to the contrary.201 The Board in a previous case had also
found that the nurse's resolution of minor grievances did not rise to the
level of adjusting grievances under the Act.20 ' However, the court
disagreed and held that no matter how flagrant a violation is, sending an
employee home is discipline using independent judgment.21  It is
interesting to note that the court did not give reasons as to why this
involved independent judgment, but only stated that it did.
B. The Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit in Glenmark Associates Inc. v. NLRB 20 also
overruled the Board's findings that nurses were not supervisors.
21
Glenmark, a consolidated decision, involved LPNs who rotated through the
position of charge nurse.212 The LPNs' duties included reporting patient
conditions, reassigning CNAs to ensure adequate staff, and filing verbal
correction notices if there was misconduct.213 The Board found the nurses
not to be supervisors because they were directing the work of lesser skilled
employees and not supervising within the meaning of the Act.214 Despite
the entitlement of deference owed to the Board, the court overruled the
Board and held that the nurses were supervisors.215 The court held that the
206. Id. (citing Warner Co. v. NLRB, 365 F.2d 435,439 (3d Cir. 1966)).
207. Although cases to the contrary exist, they are not precedent in the Third Circuit.
See e.g., Manor West, 313 N.L.R.B. 956, 957 (1994) (stating that "the independent
judgment exercised by the LPNs is merely incidental to their function, as technical
employees, of treating patients and thus is not supervisory authority in the interest of the
employer"); Dad's Foods, Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. 500, 501 (1974) (stating that the limited
authority of the "most experienced employee" of a food packaging plant to discharge
employees for intoxication "is only a very restricted, and sporadic kind of authority," which
does not confer supervisory authority).
208. Manor West, 313 N.L.R.B. at 959. The Board concluded that higher management,
not the LPNs, decided the responses and positions taken in respect to grievances. Id. This is
consistent with other Board decisions such as Illinois Veterans Home at Anna, L.P., 323
N.L.R.B. 161 (1997) and Ohio Masonic Home, Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 957, 295
N.L.R.B. 390 (1989).
209. Passavant, 149 F.3d at 249.
210. 147 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 1998).
211. Id. at335.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 336.
214. Id. at 339 (holding that they were merely sharing knowledge and expertise with
lesser skilled employees).
215. Id. at 337 (commenting that the Board is entitled to deference and can only be
overturned if there is no substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support its
findings). See also Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(establishing the degree of deference owed to "judicial" decisions of administrative bodies).
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nurses had no power to make scheduling decisions and put certain
employees to work when and where they were needed. 6 They also had
217the power to recommend disciplinary action. Despite the fact that these
recommendations were reviewed, and that the nurses did not have final say,
the court still found this authority to be supervisory.2 8
Based on the same facts the dissent came to the opposite conclusion.
The dissent correctly stated that the intent of Congress was to differentiate
between straw bosses and actual management .2 9 The test advocated by the
dissent does not look to whether an employee has discretion, but what
degree of discretion she/he has.220 The dissent also argued that when
authority is constrained by superiors it is not considered the exercise of
professional judgment.22' The dissent states a valid point: the LPNs cannot
effectively adjust grievances because a collective bargaining agreement
controls that.2  The Fourth Circuit devotes an entire page to describing
and admonishing the Board for being biased, but fails to mention that
earlier in the year, they expressed approval for the Board's results. 223
C. The Sixth Circuit.
In Mid-America Care Foundation v. NLRB224 , the Sixth Circuit
became the third circuit to overturn a Board order declaring nurses not to
be supervisors. The disputed LPNs were the highest-ranking employees at
the facility during night shifts and on the weekends.225 They evaluated
226CNAs and reassigned them if there was a staffing shortage. The Board
found that these duties, again, did not rise to the level of supervisory
216. Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 341.
217. Id. at 342-43.
218. Id. at 342 (noting that "the NLRA does not preclude supervisory status simply
because the recommendation is subject to a superior's investigation"). While the NLRA
does not preclude supervisory status in that situation, it is a factor to consider in determining
status. Id.
219. Id. at 345.
220. Id. The dissent states that there are numerous professional employees who make
complex decisions exercising professional judgment, and that that alone is not enough for
them to be supervisors. Id. at 345, 346.
221. Id. at 346. The dissent points out that the LPNs are given set procedures to follow
and their disciplinary powers are limited. The dissent also looks to what the LPNs do not
do: they have no authority to schedule CNAs, to decide when a CNA will be fired, or decide
when a CNA can take a vacation. Id.
222. Id.
223. See, e.g., Beverly Enters. v. NLRB, 136 F.3d 361, 361 (4th Cir. 1998) (approving
an order of the board declaring nurses to be non-supervisors).
224. 148 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 1998).
225. Id. at 639.
226. Id. at 640.
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status.227 The court vacated this determination and found that the nurses
had statutory authority to direct the aides.228 They also held that the nurses
effectively disciplined the aides by filling out evaluation forms, even
though the forms did not bind management.229
In the span of eleven years the Sixth Circuit has vacated six NLRB
decisions finding nurses not to be supervisors.2 '0 This particular opinion is
very brief and relies solely on the precedent of different cases with
different facts. It seems as if the Sixth Circuit ruled on the issue eleven
years ago and has not reevaluated its position since, despite different fact
patterns. Just recently, it overturned another Board order declaring nurses
not to be supervisors in Integrated Health Services of Michigan v. NLRB.
211
D. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit in NLRB v. Grancare, Inc.232 used the
"independent judgment" test and secondary factors to uphold the NLRB's
determination that nurses were not supervisors. 23' They also warned
against construing the definition of supervisor too broadly because those
who were declared supervisors lose an important right.234 The nurses in
this case communicated with doctors and worked with and directed the
CNAs, but an RN was always present.235 Therefore, the Board found
supervisory authority lacking.236 The court upheld the Board's position and
declined to look for sinister motives or bias of the Board in using the
"independent judgment" test.237 The court stated, "[i]t is not our task to
conjecture about whether the Board has tried to do an end run around an
unfavorable Supreme Court decision." 238  The standard of review is
whether their decision was arbitrary or capricious. 239
227. Id. at 643.
228. Id. at 641.
229. Id. (finding that the sensitive judgments in evaluating nurses aides, "coupled with
the power to run the nursing home without any other on site supervision," at times mandates
a conclusion that they utilize independent judgment).
230. Id. at 640.
231. 191 F.3d 703 (1999).
232. 170 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 1999).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 666 (citing Accord Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392 (1996) (stating
that reviewing courts must take care to assure that exemptions from NLRA coverage are not
so expansive as to deny protection to workers that the Act was designed to reach).
235. Id. at 664.
236. Id. at 670.
237. Id. at 666.
238. Id. The court stated that its job is to decide whether the Board's reason for
concluding that the LPNs were not supervisors is a reasonable conclusion to draw from the
evidence. Id.
239. Id.
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The court went on to look at the ratio of supervisors to non-
supervisors, a secondary factor, in order to bolster their finding that the
240nurses were not supervisors. If the nurses were considered supervisors
then the ratio of supervisors to non-supervisors would be fifty-nine to
ninety, which is extraordinarily top-heavy. 24' The court concluded that "the
Board must draw a line separating the lowest level of true supervisors-
those who are part of management's team-from those valuable employees
who are just on the other side of the line."242
The dissent argued that the Board was not entitled to deference
because it has been manipulative in interpreting the terms of the Act.
243
The dissent also argued that if the Board was granted deference, its actions
would not be vulnerable.24 However, this point is misplaced because
deference does not mean rubber-stamping; the standard of review is
whether substantial evidence on the record supports the decision.
241
E. The Eighth Circuit
246In Beverly Enterprises v. NLRB, the Eighth Circuit joined a growing
number of courts, including the Seventh Circuit, that upheld a NLRB
decision declaring nurses not to be supervisors. 247 The nurses in this case
lacked authority to require CNAs to report to work or authorize them to
leave the facility. 248 In monitoring the CNAs, they followed established
guidelines and only verbally reprimanded them.249 Therefore, the Board
found them not to be supervisors.250 The court agreed and concluded that
their disciplinary authority was extremely limited and "not sufficient for
supervisory status."25' The court also reviewed the number of supervisors
and non-supervisory employees and found that the ratio would be too high
252if the nurses were considered supervisors. Finally, the court cited a
number of cases that upheld non-supervisory status, even though the nurses
were the highest-ranking employees on the shift.2 53
240. Id. at 667.
241. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Am. Med. Serv., Inc., 705 F.2d 1472, 1473 (7th Cir. 1983))
(stating that the "highly improbable ratio of bosses to drones 'raises a warning flag').
242. Id. at 668.
243. Id. at 669.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 666.
246. 148 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 1998).
247. Id. at 1048.
248. Id. at 1046.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1047, 1048.
253. Id. at 1047 (citing NLRB v. Res-Care, 705 F.2d 1461, 1467 (7th Cir. 1983)).
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F. The First Circuit & The Latest Decision: NLRB V. Hilliard
Development Corp.24
In a decision handed down only last year, the First Circuit added to the
division among the circuits. The court upheld a Board order declaring
nurses not to be supervisors.25' The nurses in this case oversaw the work of
aides underneath them, and during the night shift were the highest-ranking
employees on the premises.256  The nurses assigned the aides to
predetermined groups and redistributed work if there was a shortage of
employees.257 Their disciplinary authority was limited to documenting
misconduct and issuing verbal warnings.25 s Therefore, the Board found
them not to be supervisors.2 9
The First Circuit agreed and stated that the evidence failed to show
that nurses effectively evaluated aides.26 Only when there was a direct
correlation between evaluations and merit bonuses would supervisory
authority be found.261 The court also held that, while the nurses possessed
some assignment power, it was so limited that it did not rise to the level of
independent judgment.262 The court stated that "such hemmed-in, limited
authority to assign work-authority which is confined by predetermined
groupings and schedules and is subject to post-action recission by a Unit
Manager-is not the independent judgment required by the Act. ...
The court then examined the nurse's ability to adjust grievances.2 4 Since
they could only resolve minor grievances, the court found that this did not
amount to supervisory authority.265
This court reversed the whole picture of the organization, including
what the nurses were not responsible for or capable of doing.266 They did
254. 187 F.3d 133 (1st Cir. 1999).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 138.
257. Id.
258. Id. (noting that the nurses could send aides home, but only for flagrant violations,
and the nurse had to notify those above them of the action).
259. Id. at 139, 140.
260. Id. at 143-44 (stating that although there is some relationship between merit pay
increases and the evaluations, the relationship is not sufficient to declare them supervisors).
Furthermore, not all the nurses filled out the evaluation forms, and many did not know of
their effect. Id. at 143.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 146 (finding that the nurses make assignments within the confines of the
predetermined groups set by management).
263. Id. (citing Northeast Utils. Serv. Corp. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 621, 625 (1st Cir. 1994)).
264. Id. at 147.
265. Id. (citing Northeast Utils. Serv. Corp. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 621, 625 (1st Cir. 1994))
(stating that the resolution of disputes does not amount to supervisory authority, especially if
they do not have ultimate responsibility for the resolution).
266. Id.
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not speak for the organization, assert any financial control, or resolve any
26726service disputes. Those activities were reserved for true management. 2"
The court then looked at the policy reasons for excluding supervisors.269
Exclusion of supervisors was supposed to benefit both management and
labor; it was supposed to avoid conflicts of interest.2 70 However, no such
conflict exist here.271 The court held that there was no reason to believe
that collective bargaining would transform these employees into disloyal
ones. 22 Finally, the court stated that there was no reason to believe that the
Board was biased or trying to apply a special test to nurses.273 It did not
matter that the test utilized seemed to resolve the question against the
employer most of the time. The court stated that if this test was meant to
resolve decisions in favor of the employer, then "the remedy is in
Congress. So long as Congress has assigned this interstitial policy-making
role to the Board, we adhere to our usual rules of deference." 274
G. Remarks
The Hilliard decision adds another opinion to the circuit split
surrounding whether nurses are supervisors under the NLRA. The Ninth
Circuit added its opinion in June of 1999, holding that the nurses were not
supervisors. 275 The ANA was concerned that the Health Care decision
276would be a major setback for collective action by nurses. However,
nurses continued to unionize and the Board consistently found them not to
277be supervisors. It turns out that the Supreme Court decision was not a
setback for nurse unionization, but the subsequent decisions of the circuit
courts are a setback. 278 These circuit courts are reversing the Board's
decisions and leaving nurses outside the protection of the Act.
267. Id. at 147.
268. Id. (finding that the central responsibility of the nurses was to care for the patients,
and that their supervisory role over aides was too miniscule to amount to real supervisory
status).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 148.
271. Id.
272. Id. (assuming that nurses will not sacrifice their professional norms for the labor
movement).
273. Id. at 141.
274. Id.
275. Northern Mont. Health Care Ctr. v. NLRB, 178 F.3d 1089, 1093-97 (9th Cir. 1999)
(discussing why the court upheld the NLRB's decision finding nurses were not supervisors).
276. Benedetto, supra note 22, at 724.
277. Id.
278. Several circuits have found that nurses are supervisors. For examples of cases that
have held LPNs to be supervisors under the definition of the NLRA, see Beverly Enters.-W.
Va. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 1999); NLRB v. Atlleboro Assoc., Ltd, 176 F.3d 154
(3rd Cir. 1999); Caremore, Inc. v. NLRB, 129 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 1997).
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Different judges in the same circuit have taken the same set of facts
and come to opposite conclusions as to whether or not nurses are
2280supervisors. 79 In this "war[] of the nurses" ' it is not fair to leave such an
important question up to the luck of whatever judges happen to be sitting
on the bench that day. If it is reasonable to decide the cases either way
based on the facts, then the next step should be to look at the policy
implications of each decision.
V. THE IMPLICATIONS ON UNIONS AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT IF
NURSES ARE CONSIDERED SUPERVISORS
Justice Ginsburg sparked a debate over the fate of professional unions
281in her dissent in NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America.
She warned that if courts construe the definition of "supervisor" too
broadly, then professionals would not receive coverage from the Act.282 If
the courts whittle away the distinction between independent judgment and
professional judgment, then virtually all professionals would lose the
coverage of the Act.283 Therefore, professional unions, not only for nurses,
but also architects and engineers, will cease to exist.
If there is an established union in place already, some commentators
have argued that many employers would not "take on the union" and try to
declare that their nurses are supervisors.2 4 However, this is contradicted
by the plethora of cases where nursing homes have asserted that their
nurses are supervisors.28' Employers stand to gain a lot if their nurses are
declared supervisors. The nurses lose protection of the NLRA and in many
286cases, removal of nurses from the bargaining unit will defeat the union.
The growing number of circuits that are vacating Board judgments and
declaring nurses supervisors will only add fuel to employers' fire in
contesting bargaining units. As more employers challenge the nurses'
coverage, it is less likely that nurses will want to unionize because of the
279. See, e.g., Caremore, 129 F.3d at 369.
280. Hilliard, 187 F.3d at 144.
281. 511 U.S. 571 (1994).
282. Id. at 598.
283. Id. (stating that "[tihe Court's opinion has implications far beyond the nurses
involved in this case. If any person who may use independent judgment to assign tasks to
others or direct their work is a supervisor, then few professionals employed by organizations
subject to the Act will receive its protections.")
284. Barker, supra note 31, at 371.
285. See generally id. (mentioning many cases in which nursing homes have asserted
that their nurses are supervisors).
286. See Glenmark Assoc. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 333, 337 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding that
where nine nurses-LPNs and RNs-voted for union representation, thus giving the union a
majority, if any number of the nurses are excluded as supervisors, the majority may
disappear).
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uncertainty and instability it brings.2 7 Some commentators also say that
218nurses can bargain to have the employer declare them non-supervisors.
However, many nurses do not reach that point if they cannot receive union
representation because they are considered supervisors.
A. The Implications of Nurses Being Classified as Supervisors
If nurses are declared supervisors, they will not have the protections of
the Act,289 and, therefore, will have little incentive to join unions. Roughly
twenty-four percent of the 3.6 million full-time employees in hospitals are
RNs; this is a large number of employees for the labor movement to lose.290
Furthermore, since only twenty percent of RNs are unionized, the labor
movement also loses the potential it had to organize the remainder of
RNs.29 It would be a huge boost to the labor movement if unions could
organize nurses because currently, ninety percent of the 10.5 million health
care workers are not unionized.292 If the supervisory status classification of
nurses spreads to other fields, professional unions will be virtually non-
existent.293 Hence, the labor movement will receive another blow at a time
when it is in crisis. Forty years ago, one in three private employees
belonged to a union, but that number has since dropped to one in ten.294 As
the labor movement declines, inequality increases.295
Because the labor movement has been in trouble for many years, some
have proposed radical measures in order to revitalize it.296 Declaring nurses
to be non-supervisory is not radical; it was Congress's intent and will help
breathe new life into the movement. As the long-term health care industry
continues to grow, the labor movement can organize it and, therefore, gain
287. Paul F. Gleeson, Collective Action and Unionization in Health Care: A
Management Attorney's View, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 915, 916 (1997) (stating that turmoil
scares employees and thus impedes unionization because employees associate instability
with unions). Employers often use this fear as a tactic to discourage unionization. Id.
288. NLRB v. Hilliard Dev. Corp., 187 F.3d 133, 144 (lst Cir. 1999).
289. 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1994).
290. Benedetto, supra note 22, at 725.
291. Id. This potential of organizing the remainder of RNs was just starting to be
realized by the labor movement. The ANA approved collective action of nurses and
recognized them as professionals, which helped pave the way for organization. Id.
292. Gleeson, supra note 287, at 915.
293. See generally id.
294. Jonathan P. Hiatt & Lee W. Jackson, Union Survival Strategies for the Twenty-First
Century, 12 LAB. LAw. 165, 165 (1996).
295. Id. at 166 (advocating that the labor movement needs to address the surge in
inequality that has occurred due to the decrease in union representation).
296. Marion Crain, Building Solidarity Through Expansion of NLRA Coverage: A
Blueprint for Worker Empowerment, 74 MINN. L. REv. 953, 960-961 (1990) (proposing that
all supervisors should be considered employees).
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strength.297
In addition, in an effort to revitalize, the labor movement is
experimenting with new systems, including labor-management
partnerships. 298 Labor is facing a catch-twenty-two in this respect. In order
for these attempts to be successful, employees have to assume more
responsibility on the job.299 However, if the definition of "supervisor" is
broadly interpreted, then employees who assume this responsibility will
jeopardize their coverage under the Act. Therefore, they may not want to
assume more responsibility, thus hindering the progress of the labor
movement.
B. The Specific Effect if LPNs are Considered Supervisors
As the economy changes, more and more people yearn for secure,
long-term employment. However, the reality of downsizing and
competition has lead more employers to hire "contingent workers."3°°
These workers can be skilled, but are not part of an employer's core
workforce.01 Therefore, they do not carry much bargaining power. CNAs
fall within this category of employees.3 2 RNs and LPNs are usually part of
the employer's core workforce and possess skills employers need.303
Therefore, they possess greater bargaining power then the CNAs.304 By
putting LPNs and CNAs in the same bargaining unit, the union, as a whole,
has more power and leverage in a bargaining session.305 However, if nurses
are declared supervisors, they will not have any leverage because they are
not covered by the Act. In addition, CNAs, because of their lower skill
level, may not want to take the chance of organizing alone in the first place
because of fear of employer retaliation.3°6 The LPNs in the group help to
strengthen solidarity and curb illegal firings.307
The health care industry has undergone reconstruction in the past
decade, moving away from public healthcare toward privatization."'
297. Motley, supra note 198, at 711 (stating that organized labor has targeted the
nursing-home industry for intensive organizational activity in order to gain more strength in
the service economy).
298. Hiatt & Jackson, supra note 294, at 165, 169.
299. Id. at 170.
300. Id. at 167.
301. Id. at 171.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 168.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 174 (stating that the Dunlop Commission estimated that in organizing drives
with unskilled workers, illegal firings occur in one out of every four organizing drives).
308. Jewett, supra note 127, at 1143.
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Therefore, medicine and hospitals have become big business.3°9 As the
industry is in turmoil, many may look to unions to provide them with
security.3' ° However, the division within the courts negatively impacts the
perception of unions; many now see unions as a conflict-causing force.3
VI. THE IMPLICATIONS OF PHYSICIAN UNIONIZATION IF NURSES ARE
CONSIDERED SUPERVISORS
Until recently, physicians did not organize in large numbers.3 12 Many
thought it unnecessary as they were viewed as independent contractors and
not employees.1 3 With the rise of Health Maintenance Organizations
("HMOs"), doctors now have less autonomy in patient care and look more
like employees then independent contractors.3 4 Economic pressures and
HMOs now make decisions that had typically been reserved for
physicians.315 However, the lengthy training and educational process that
doctors endure creates a strong belief that they should control patient
care.316 Therefore, doctors are now attempting to unionize in large numbers
to deal with the changing face of health care.317 Unionized physicians now
318comprise 42,000 of the 756,000 physicians in this country.
Physicians advance arguments similar to those of nurses. They claim
that HMOs have taken away a substantial portion of their discretion,
resulting in a lack of independent judgment.3 9  The Board apparently
agreed and held that doctors are not supervisors because they had minimal
320authority to direct the work of other employees.
309. Id. at 1144.
310. Id. at1145.
311. NLRB v. Healthcare & Retirement Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 598 (1994)
(pointing out that in other industries, where there is less division, employees usually seek
unions to offer them stability and security).
312. Jewett, supra note 127, at 1136.
313. Id. (stating that physicians are typically paid more and, therefore, have less
incentive to organize).
314. Id.
315. Id. at 1144.
316. Id.
317. See generally Chris Phan, Physician Unionization, 20 J. LEGAL MED. 115 (1999).
Phan discusses that the labor movement has not seen such a surge in unionization since the
1970s. Physicians started to organize in 1970 when managed care started to encroach on
their decision-making. They formed the longest-lasting physicians union, the Union of
American Physicians and Dentists ("UAPD"). However, unionization in the medical field
decreased in the 1980s. The 1990s then saw the reemergence of physician unions due to
cuts in staff and lack of autonomy in patient care. Id. at 129-131.
318. Id. at 130.
319. Id. Therefore, they argue, they are not independent physicians, but merely
employees, and thus, labor laws should protect them.
320. Id. at 131.
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In 1997 the American Medical Association ("AMA") announced its
support for physician unions.321 They believe that unions are necessary to
bargain collectively on issues such as compensation and decision-making
32power. To achieve this end they are trying to establish the first union
ever organized under the AMA.3z Critics of physician unions fear that
patient care will suffer if doctors are permitted to strike.324 However, as it
stands, doctors will continue to have less leverage to demand more patient
care rights and that will have a disastrous effect on the quality of health
care in this country.32' There also may be a solution in the form of a
professional association that does not resort to strikes, but at a minimum
will give physicians a voice.
3 26
Physicians are professionals and, therefore, should be able to unionize.
However, if courts find that nurses are supervisors under the Act, then
327doctors will undoubtedly be declared supervisors as well. Currently, the
courts are split, as they are in the nurse cases, as to whether doctors are
supervisors or not.32s If courts rule nurses "responsibly direct" aides, then it
can be argued that doctors direct nurses.329 If nurses are supervisors, one
finds it hard to believe that doctors could avoid a similar classification.
However, this contradicts Congress' intent to exclude professionals from
the definition of supervisor.
As HMOs grow, physicians will lose more rights and their bargaining
power will dwindle.330 Unions can combat this inequality of bargaining
power and the labor movement can also revitalize itself in the process. The
321. Id. at 136 (citing Mary Chris Jaklevic, Wanted: Bargaining Power: AMA Urges
Freedom for Self-Employed Docs to Unionize in Response to Managed Care, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, June 30, 1997, at 17).
322. Id. at 137 (claiming that the AMA believes their union will allow physicians to
bargain collectively on vital issues).
323. Id.
324. 125 CONG. REc. 33,943, 33,950 (1979) (statement of Rep. Erdahl).
325. Jewett, supra note 127, at 1144 (stating that the widespread changes in the structure
of health care delivery have caused decisions about patient care to be dictated by economic
pressures to minimize services and cut costs).
326. Phan, supra note 317, at 139 (suggesting that new laws permitting professional
organizations for physicians under the AMA would increase their bargaining power without
resorting to union tactics).
327. Id. at 126.
328. Id. at 126-29 (reporting that the District of Columbia Circuit has upheld a Board
decision declaring that doctors were not supervisors, while an Illinois Appellate Court has
vacated a Board decision declaring the doctors in question were not supervisors).
329. Id. at 122 (stating that the factors to consider in determining whether a doctor is a
supervisor are: degree of skill needed for job, authority to hire and discharge workers,
control over compensation of other employees, and whether the premises are controlled by
the employer).
330. Id. at 137 (stating that physicians lost decision-making rights and, thus, bargaining
power, as a result of HMO growth).
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circuits, given the same facts, are split as to whether both nurses and
doctors are supervisors.33' As a result, both positions have facts and law to
support it and are, therefore, reasonable.
There are major policy reasons for finding nurses not to be
supervisors. The most profound one is the intent of Congress to exclude
them from the statutory definition of supervisor. Given that an extremely
valuable right is at stake and deference to the Board is warranted, Congress
should amend the NLRA to establish a rebuttable presumption that nurses
are not supervisors. In the meantime, the courts should give effect to
congressional intent, by instituting a rebuttable presumption that nurses are
not supervisors and deferring to the NLRB.
VII. ANALYSIS: A REBUTrABLE PRESUMPTION THAT NURSES ARE NOT
SUPERVISORS
As it stands, different circuits have taken similar facts and arrived at
different conclusions as to whether nurses are supervisors. This distinction
seems to depend on where one lives and what circuit has jurisdiction there.
Once the hurdle of residing in a circuit that declares nurses non-supervisory
has been cleared, the struggle is not over. The specific panel of judges in a
given case could be outcome determinative, since judges in the same circuit
have taken exactly the same facts and reached opposite conclusions.332
Therefore, if you are a nurse fighting for representation, your fate may
depend on who is sitting on the bench that day.
Although the ANA believes that nurses are not supervisors, some
courts have given little deference to this qualified opinion. The ANA states
that it perceives nurses to be professionals under the NLRA, but not
professionals exercising supervisory authority.333 It claims that nurses give
professional direction to other aides and do not exercise traditional
supervisory power.334 Although the ANA is not entitled to the deference
that the Board is, its opinion of what its colleagues do on a daily basis
should factor into a court's determination of whether or not nurses are
considered supervisors.
The right to be protected under the NLRA is too important to be left
331. Id. at 126-29.
332. See Glenmark Assocs. Inc. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 333, 345 (4th Cir. 1998) (Jones, J.,
dissenting) (reaching a conclusion opposite to that of the majority, based on the same facts).
333. Brief of Amici Curiae American Nurses Association at 9, NLRB v. Health Care &
Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571 (1994) (No. 92-1964).
334. Id. Although nurses exercise independent judgment in directing others, it is
considered professional authority and not the typical supervisory authority to recommend
hiring, firing, promotion, and discharge required in order to be considered a supervisor
under the NLRA. Id.
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up to chance.3 35 Sensible people can look at the objective facts of what
these nurses do and arrive at starkly different conclusions. Both
interpretations may be reasonable, and if they are, which one wins? If both
are reasonable interpretations, I argue that we first look to the
consequences of each one, and then to congressional intent to come up with
the correct answer. I believe that in almost all cases, Congress did not
intend for nurses to be supervisors. Therefore, the courts should give
deference to the Board and congressional intent and apply a rebuttable
presumption that nurses are not supervisors. The employer has a chance to
rebut this presumption in the rare case where the nurses truly are
supervisors. This threshold should be fairly high so that courts do not
circumvent congressional intent and declare nurses supervisors. Finally,
Congress should pass the specific amendment to the NLRA they thought
was not needed in 1974, and declare nurses not to be supervisors.
A. Courts Should Employ A Presumption That Nurses Are Not
Supervisors
The Board has consistently held that nurses are not supervisors.336
However some circuits have vacated the Board's decision and found nurses
to be supervisors.337 The whole issue has become, in the words of the
Hilliard court, a "war between the nurses." 38  In order to establish
uniformity, the courts, whether they agree with the decision or not, should
give deference to the Board, until there is a congressional mandate
otherwise. They should also give deference to congressional intent and
employ a presumption that nurses are not supervisors.
The Board is to be given deference when a statute is ambiguous.
339
The Supreme Court ruled that the term "independent judgment" was
ambiguous.m In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council,4 the Supreme Court held that when an administrative agency is
charged with enforcing a statute, judicial review of that agency's decision
is a two-step process. 342 The first question is whether Congress has directly
335. NLRB v. Grancare, Inc., 170 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1151, 1158 (7th Cir. 1970)) (stating that the board has a duty
not to construe supervisory status too broadly because an employee who is declared a
supervisor loses a valuable right).
336. Although some circuits have overruled the Board's decision in every case in this
comment, the Board found the nurses in question not to be supervisors.
337. See, e.g., Grancare, 170 F.3d at 666.
338. NLRB v. Hilliard Dev. Corp., 187 F.3d 133, 144 (1st Cir. 1999).
339. NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 579 (1994).
340. Id.
341. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
342. Id. at 842-43.
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spoken on the issue. If it has, courts must give effect to the will of
Congress.3 43 The Supreme Court has already ruled that the Committee
Reports of 1974 are not entitled to the full weight of law, therefore,
Congress has not spoken directly on the issue 2 4 The next inquiry is
whether the agency's interpretation is a permissible construction of the
statute.345 If it is, then the agency's findings are awarded deference. 46 The
Board's findings here that nurses are supervisors is a reasonable
construction of the statute given the committee reports and the fact that half
of the circuits have upheld their decisions. Thus, the standard of review for
an appellate court is whether the Board's determination is supported by
substantial evidence.3 47
Given very similar facts, other circuits, including the First Circuit in
Hilliard, have ruled that there is substantial evidence that nurses are not
supervisors.348 The nurses in all of the cases did not have the power to
make any final decisions concerning pay, hiring, or firing. 49 The fact that
they were the highest-ranking employees on the premises during the night
shift did not necessarily indicate that they were supervisors.3 50 In most
cases, a supervisor was on call or could be reached if any significant
decisions had to be made.3 1  Therefore, there was substantial evidence
supporting the Board's finding of non-supervisory status. It does not
matter if two conclusions can be drawn from the evidence, as long as their
352decision is supported by substantial evidence. Although some circuits
come to different conclusions, because there is substantial evidence
supporting the Board's decision it should be awarded deference.
Some circuits do not want to award deference to the Board because
they feel that the Board is biased, and is manipulating the definition of
supervisor to purposefully exclude nurses. 35 3 The fact that the Board's
343. Id. at 842.
344. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 582. The committee reports of 1974 were statements
made by senators in Congress, and, therefore, can be considered an indirect statement of
congressional intent. They felt a specific amendment was not needed in order to exempt
health care professionals from the Act due to previous Board decisions. S. REP. No. 93-766,
at 6 (1974).
345. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
346. Id. at 844.
347. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,488 (1951) (holding that Congress
has stated that a reviewing court is not barred from setting aside a Board decision when it
cannot conscientiously find evidence supporting the decision).
348. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hilliard Dev. Corp., 187 F.3d 133, 140-41 (1st Cir. 1999).
349. See, e.g., NLRB v. Grancare, Inc., 170 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 1999) (addressing
the status of nurses as supervisors and non-supervisors).
350. Glenmark Assocs. Inc. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 333, 347 (1999).
351. See, e.g., id. at 341.
352. Am. Textile Mfr. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 523 (1981).
353. For one example, see Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 338 (stating that the "independent
judgment" test is an end run around an unfavorable Supreme Court decision). However, this
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decisions are consistent does not support this conclusion. They are
consistent because the Board is trying to give effect to the congressional
policy not to include nurses as supervisors. If a test tends to favor one side,
the remedy lies with Congress and not the courts.3 54 Also, it is not the
court's role to speculate whether the Board is biased.355 The First Circuit
stated that "there is no reason, from the facts of this case, to believe that the
Board continues de facto, if not de jure, to apply a special test to nurses."
356
Their role is to decide if the Board has drawn a reasonable conclusion from
the evidence and defer to them on factual questions.357 The Board has been
making these types of decisions since 1935, when Congress vested it with
the power to interpret ambiguities in the Act.358 Whether nurses are
supervisors is, in part, a question of fact, and, therefore, deference should
be given to the Board.359
In addition to deference to the Board, the courts should give effect to
congressional intent and utilize a presumption that nurses are not
supervisors. When Congress passed the amendments to the NLRA in 1974,
they debated whether or not to pass a specific amendment exempting
nurses from the definition of supervisor.3'6  Both the House of
Representatives and the Senate agreed with previous Board determinations
that the professional judgment exercised by nurses was not supervisory
authority.36' However, they felt an amendment would be unnecessary
given existing Board decisions regarding health care employees.3 62 The
committee noted that "the Board has carefully avoided applying the
definition of supervisor to a health care professional who gives direction to
others in the exercise of professional judgment... and thus is not the
exercise of supervisory authority. 3 63  They then advised the Board to
continue evaluating cases in the same fashion.364 It is evident, therefore,
that Congress did not intend to include nurses in the statutory definition of
supervisor.
Although the reports do not carry the full weight of law, they
ignores the fact that the Board utilized the "independent judgment" test before the
"incidental to patient care" test. Therefore, this was not a new test that the Board created to
avoid the Health Care decision. Keller, supra note 29, at 593.
354. Hilliard, 187 F.3d at 141.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. NLRB v. Grancare, Inc., 170 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that the court
declines to look for sinister motives).
358. Id. at 266.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
362. S. REP. No. 93-766, at 6 (1974).
363. Id.
364. Id.
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undoubtedly express Congress' intent to narrow the definition of
supervisor. In addition, prior to 1974, the Board had consistently held that
nurses were not supervisors because they exercised professional and not
supervisory judgment.365 When Congress re-enacted the statute in 1974 it
did not alter this interpretation.366 The Supreme Court has held that when
Congress re-enacts a statute without changing an agency's existing
interpretation, great weight is given to that interpretation. 367
When Congress initially passed the exclusion for supervisors it made a
distinction between those who have minor supervisory duties and those
vested with genuine management power.36 Congress did not mean to
include all employees who direct others in the definition of supervisor;
supervisors must have adequate control over their employment
conditions.369 The limited authority that these nurses possess does not rise
to that level of management. They simply direct others in accordance with
their professional norms and do not possess any real power over
employees.370 There must be a distinction between professional judgment
and supervisory authority or the inclusion of professionals in the Act will
cease to exist. The policy of the NLRA is to include as many employees as
possible in order to offer adequate protection within the workplace.371
Therefore, the general policy of the NLRA itself supports a presumption
that nurses are not supervisors.
Due to deference to the Board and the intent of Congress, the Supreme
Court should resolve this circuit split by instituting a rebuttable
presumption that nurses are not supervisors. All courts would have to
follow this presumption until Congress definitively states its intention.
This presumption can be rebutted by compelling evidence that the nurses in
question are truly supervisors. This presumption may discourage
employers from challenging Board decisions and thus, decrease the amount
of litigation in this area. Also, if the status of nurses remains in flux, then
employers currently have incentive to place just enough supervisory
authority in the job description to have them declared supervisors.
The presumption will also help the health care industry as a whole.
When nurses collectively bargain, they often negotiate for better patient
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Keller, supra note 29, at 589 (citing NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267, 274-75
(1974)).
368. Benedetto, supra note 22, at 702.
369. Id. at 708.
370. NLRB v. Grancare, Inc., 170 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that nurses are,
if not full-fledged professionals, at least sub-professionals, and some supervisory authority
does rise from that, but it is not enough to declare them supervisors).
371. Barbara A. Lee, Collective Bargaining and Employee Participation: An Anomalous
Interpretation of the National Labor relations Act, 38 LAB. L.J. 274,274 (1987).
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care as well as their own needs.7 The presumption that nurses are not
supervisors will allow this bargaining to occur.
The presumption would also benefit employees. As the health care
market rapidly changes, employees are left without job security. As costs
increase and competition tightens, employers downsize to maintain
profits.373  Unions are needed to protect workers. However, with this
circuit split and confusion over whether nurses are supervisors, nurses are
fearful of organizing.374 Employers constantly challenge the bargaining
units and if they are found to be supervisors, they may suffer retaliation.
The presumption may restore nurses' confidence to organize at a time when
they need it most. The presumption would also increase solidarity among
the different levels of nurses, and, therefore, improve patient care. There
should not be a fear of divided loyalty between management and nurses
because nurses do not make final decisions regarding pay, hiring, or firing.
Some argue that if nurses are not supervisors, then they will not reprimand
aides and patient abuse may rise.375 However, nurses are professionals and
there is no reason to doubt their ethics. If employers wanted nurses to
remedy problems of patient abuse, then management would have given
them genuine authority to discipline.
Finally, adhering to the legislative intent that nurses are not
supervisors helps maintain the separation of powers.376 The judiciary is
supposed to look first to congressional intent when interpreting statutes.377
In this debate, Congress clearly intended for nurses not to be supervisors.
A presumption that nurses are not supervisors fulfills Congress' intent until
they assert a different position on the issue.
B. NLRB v. Hilliard Was Correctly Decided
The First Circuit's opinion in Hilliard contained a thorough analysis
and accurately touched on the important policy issues behind this debate.
The court held that the nurses were not supervisors because their authority
was limited.378  The court went on to state that there needs to be a
distinction between professional judgment, which these nurses exercise,
372. Jewett, supra note 127, at 1127.
373. King, supra note 3, at 343.
374. NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 585 (1994).
375. Motley, supra note 198, at 742.
376. Keller, supra note 29, at 577 (stating that textualism threatens the separation of
powers doctrine).
377. Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in
Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L.
REv. 277, 308 (1990).
378. 187 F.3d 133, 147 (lst Cir. 1999).
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and independent judgment that supervisors employ.379 If courts eliminate
this distinction, then professionals in general will lose coverage under the
Act.380 The court also gave the correct amount of deference to the Board in
stating that they "defer to that interpretation as a 'permissible construction'
of ambiguous language.
381
The court thoroughly examined each duty the nurses had and
382concluded that they were not supervisory in nature. Next, they looked at
what powers the nurses lacked in order to prove that they were not truly
part of management.383 The fact that the nurses have no input in policies
and assert no financial control over the organization reinforced the court's
view that the nurses were not supervisors.384 The court then took a step
back and viewed the whole picture; it looked at the policy behind
supervisor exclusion. 385 The Act was designed to cover all those who were
386not vested with genuine management authority. The court held that the
real responsibility of nurses is to care for their patients, and whatever
supervisory authority they may have is modest compared with that
responsibility. 37 This relative analysis supports the goal of the NLRA to
cover as many workers as possible.388
The court concluded that while nurses may play an important role in
the hospital or nursing home, that does not make them supervisors.3' 9 The
court pointed out that important roles are played by many people who are
not supervisors .39  This highlights the distinction between minor
supervisory roles that some employees occupy and possession of true
management power. While there is no clear line between those two, the
court in Hilliard properly looked at the policy behind the NLRA and placed
nurses were they belong-on the non-supervisor side.
C. Congress Should Amend the NLRA to Exclude Nurses As Supervisors
Courts should employ the presumption that nurses are not supervisors
until there is a congressional mandate to the contrary. In 1974, when they
passed the health care amendments to the NLRA, Congress debated passing
379. Id. at 142.
380. See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1994).
381. Hilliard, 187 F.3d at 143.
382. Id. at 147.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 148.
386. S. REP. No. 80-105, at 4 (1947).
387. Hilliard, 187 F.3d at 146. Therefore, the court concluded there would be no divided
loyalty. Id. at 148.
388. Keller, supra note 29, at 578-83.
389. Hilliard, 187 F.3d at 148.
390. Keller, supra note 29, at 585-86.
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a specific amendment that would exempt health care workers from the
definition of supervisor. 91 However, given Board decisions at that time
they thought it unnecessary.392 Perhaps they did not envision that circuits
would vacate Board decisions, or that the Supreme Court would declare the
"incidental to patient care" test invalid. Whatever the reason, the
amendment that was unnecessary then now is needed to resolve a circuit
spilt.
Congress should give binding legal effect to the legislative intent they
had in 1947 and 1974. In 1947, when it excluded supervisors, Congress
never meant to exclude those employees that had minor supervisory
duties.393 In these cases, the nurses do have some supervisory duties, but
they are minor compared to the rest of their responsibilities.394 The
authority they do have is limited by upper management and requires little
independent judgment.3 95
If Congress needed to be persuaded beyond their own intent in 1974
and 1947, they could examine the policy reasons why nurses should be
declared non-supervisory. Currently there is a circuit split among the
courts and valuable NLRA rights are decided by geography.396 There is an
immense inequality because nurses with similar duties are supervisors in
one circuit, but not in another. Reasonable people can come to opposite
conclusions as to whether nurses are supervisors. If each conclusion is
reasonable, then Congress should weigh the effect of each decision on the
labor movement and other professionals. These considerations tip the scale
in support of the conclusion that nurses are not supervisors. The number of
professional workers in unions has increased substantially in recent
years.397 This may be the new blood that the labor movement needs to gain
momentum. However, if nurses are declared supervisors, then it will be
more difficult for doctors to argue that they are not supervisors. Hence, the
labor movement will lose not only the health care members it has
organized, but the potential to organize the rest of the industry.
391. Id. at 587.
392. Id. n.65.
393. See S. REP. No. 80-105, at 3-4 (1947).
394. Keller, supra note 29, at 586 n.55.
395. Id. n.54.
396. King, supra note 3, at 358 (stating that "[a] determination of whether a nurse is a
supervisor within the meaning of Section 2(11) may very well depend on which federal
court the parties litigate their case").
397. Keller, supra note 29, at 577.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The issue of whether nurses are supervisors has divided the circuits in
some fashion for over twenty years. Rather than resolving the split, the
Health Care decision, by invalidating the "incidental to patient care" test,
created another one. Now circuits battle over the meaning of independent
judgment. While they fight it out, an inequality is permeating the country.
Nurses with similar duties in one state are declared supervisors, and,
therefore, are not covered by the Act, while those in other states enjoy
NLRA protection:
The Board has consistently found nurses not to be supervisors
within the meaning of Section 2(11) for a variety of reasons. The
Seventh Circuit summed it up in stating, "the Board must draw a
line separating the lowest level of true supervisors ... from those
valuable employees who are just on the other side of the line.
Those just on the other side of the line are employees who
exercise some authority but not enough to be considered more
than part of the regular work force. 398
This line is hard to draw, especially in industries where employees
exercise professional judgment. But given the Board's expertise in this
area and the fact that Congress vested it with the power to enforce the
NLRA, courts should defer to the Board.
Courts should also give effect to the congressional intent not to
include nurses within the definition of supervisor, and employ a
presumption that they are not supervisors. Although the legislative history
of the amendments was discredited in the Health Care decision, the dissent
and many circuits since then have held it to be of great value in
determining congressional intent.399 It holds the answer as to whether
Congress intended to include nurses within the definition of supervisors.
Those that do not like the answer, discredit it. However, "legislative
history is an authoritative product of the work of Congress and represents
the way Congress has chosen to communicate with the outside world. To
second guess Congress' chosen form of communication... arguably
infringes on the separation of powers doctrine."'
The presumption that nurses are not supervisors may have to be
evaluated in the future as nurses are vested with more power.40' However
as it stands now their authority does not rise to the statutory definition of
supervisor. Courts should examine the consequences of the circuit split,
398. NLRB v. Grancare, 170 F.3d 662, 667-68 (7th Cir. 1999).
399. 511 U.S. 511,596 (1994).
400. Keller, supra note 29, at 623.
401. See MacLeod, supra note 161, at 334 (stating that the trend is to hold nurses more
accountable for what occurs in health care facilities).
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and the inequality it creates, and employ the presumption that nurses are
not supervisors.
